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Communication or influence networks are probably the most controllable of all factors that are
known to impact on the problem-solving capability of task-forces. In the case connections are costly,
it is necessary to implement a policy to allocate them to the individuals. Here we use an agent-based
model to study how distinct allocation policies affect the performance of a group of agents whose task
is to find the global maxima of NK fitness landscapes. Agents cooperate by broadcasting messages
informing on their fitness and use this information to imitate the fittest agent in their influence
neighborhoods. The larger the influence neighborhood of an agent, the more links, and hence
information, the agent receives. We find that the elitist policy in which agents with above-average
fitness have their influence neighborhoods amplified, whereas agents with below-average fitness have
theirs deflated, is optimal for smooth landscapes, provided the group size is not too small. For
rugged landscapes, however, the elitist policy can perform very poorly for certain group sizes. In
addition, we find that the egalitarian policy, in which the size of the influence neighborhood is the
same for all agents, is optimal for both smooth and rugged landscapes in the case of small groups.
The welfarist policy, in which the actions of the elitist policy are reversed, is always suboptimal,
i.e., depending on the group size it is outperformed by either the elitist or the egalitarian policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Solving real-world problems typically entails overcom-
ing obstacles that are beyond the capabilities of a single
person, thus requiring the cooperative and coordinated
effort of individuals organized in task-oriented groups or
epistemic communities, broadly viewed as social systems
consisting of producers of knowledge [1, 2]. Informa-
tion in these systems flows between individuals via social
contacts and, in the cooperative problem-solving setting,
a key process is imitative learning as expressed in this
quote by Bloom “Imitative learning acts like a synapse,
allowing information to leap the gap from one creature
to another” [3]. In the context of epistemic communities,
imitative learning is known as exploitation since it corre-
sponds to the search strategy in which the agent borrows
known solutions from its network of influencers. This
contrasts with exploration, which is seen as the develop-
ment of novel solutions by the agent [4, 5].
Here we assume that the amount of information an
agent can access (i.e., the number of its potential influ-
encers) has a social cost (e.g., it is publicly funded) and
we examine the influence of different policies of allocation
of resources to the agents on the efficiency of the group
to complete the task. These policies are based on the
quality of the partial solutions the agents offer to solve
the task. To address this problem we use an agent-based
model where the agents perform individual trial-and-test
searches to probe a fitness landscape (exploration) and
imitate a model agent – the best performing agent in
their influence neighborhood at the trial (exploitation)
[6–8]. We consider a scenario where the agents are fixed
at the nodes of a random geometric graph [10] and can
interact with each other if the distance between them is
less than a prespecified threshold. In addition, the agents
vary their radiuses of interaction following a prescription
or policy that depends only on their (relative) fitness.
This feature results in a time-dependent, adaptive di-
rected network that links the agents to their influencers.
The task of the agents is to find the global maxima
of smooth and rugged fitness landscapes generated with
the NK model [9]. The performance of the group is mea-
sured by the properly scaled number of trials (or time)
required to find those maxima. In particular, the collec-
tive search ends when one of the agents finds the global
maximum. The amount of information allocated to an
agent is determined by the number of agents in its influ-
ence neighborhood, which equals the number of incoming
connections, and here we consider three distinct policies.
The elitist policy in which the agents with above-average
fitness amplify their influence neighborhoods whereas the
agents with below-average fitness shrink theirs; the wel-
farist policy in which those actions are reversed; and the
egalitarian policy in which the size of the influence neigh-
borhood is the same for all agents, regardless of their
fitness. Since the fitness of the agents change as they
explore the state space of the fitness landscape, so do
their influence neighborhoods, resulting in adaptive di-
rected communication networks, which we characterize
through the number and size of their strongly connected
components.
The scenario considered here bears a resemblance to
the predicament that funding agencies and governments
face when allocating resources among alternative com-
peting research programs aiming at solving the same
problem [1, 2]. In fact, the priority rule for allocating
credit in science by which only the first person to a dis-
covery gets the recognition supports our decision to halt
the search the first time an agent finds the global maxi-
mum: once a result has been discovered, no value to the
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2collective is produced by discovering it again [11, 12]. In
that sense, welfarism is not a so far-fetched policy for
resource allocation since it is arguably a sensible strat-
egy from the perspective of the collective good to fo-
ment agents with below-average performances in order
to maintain a diversity of approaches to unsolved prob-
lems. In addition, similar agent-based models have also
been used to study welfare in the context of human co-
operation [13].
We find that for both smooth and rugged landscapes
the welfarist policy is always suboptimal, i.e., it is outper-
formed either by the elitist or by the egalitarian policies.
In addition, for small group sizes the egalitarian policy
always yields the optimal performance. Except for small
groups, the elitist policy is the optimal choice in the case
of the smooth landscapes without local maxima, but a
too large amplification of the influence neighborhoods of
the agents with above-average fitness may seriously harm
the performance of groups of intermediate size in the case
of rugged landscapes. As expected, high-fitness outliers
in the initial randomly generated group are very likely
to win the search (i.e., to find the global maximum first)
under the elitist policy. Most surprisingly, however, is
the finding that even in a situation of strong welfare, the
high-fitness outliers of the initial generation are still more
likely to become winners, so the welfarist policy cannot
reverse the random initial fitness inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present a brief description of the NK model
of rugged fitness landscapes. In Section III, we describe
the rules for setting up the influence neighborhoods of
the agents as well as the implementation of the imitative
learning search to explore the state spaces of fitness land-
scapes. In Section ??, we study the performance of this
search for both smooth and rugged landscapes focusing
on the effects of the group size and of the policies of allo-
cation of information. Finally, Section IV is reserved for
our concluding remarks.
II. NK-FITNESS LANDSCAPES
The NK model [9] is a computational implementation
of fitness landscapes that has been extensively used to
study optimization problems in population genetics, de-
velopmental biology and protein folding [14]. It was in-
troduced originally to model the adaptive evolution pro-
cess as walks on rugged fitness landscapes and its main
advantage, which led to its widespread use in complexity
science, is the possibility of tuning the ruggedness of the
landscape by changing the two integer parameters that
give the model its name, namely, N and K. More point-
edly, the NK landscape is defined in the space of binary
strings of length N and so the parameter N determines
the size of the state space, 2N . The other parameter
K = 0, . . . , N − 1 determines the range of the epistatic
interactions among the bits of the binary string and influ-
ences strongly the number of local maxima on the land-
scape. In time, two bits are said to be epistatic whenever
the combined effects of their contributions to the fitness
of the binary string are not merely additive [9]. In par-
ticular, for K = 0 the corresponding (smooth) landscape
has one single maximum whereas for K = N − 1, the
(uncorrelated) landscape has on the average 2N/ (N + 1)
maxima with respect to single bit flips [15].
In the NK model, each string x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) with
xi = 0, 1 has a fitness value Φ (x) that is given by the
average of the contributions of each component i in the
string, i.e.,
Φ (x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φi (x) , (1)
where φi is the contribution of component i to the fitness
of string x. It is assumed that φi depends on the state
xi as well as on the states of the K right neighbors of
i, i.e., φi = φi (xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+K) with the arithmetic
in the subscripts done modulo N . It is assumed, in ad-
dition, that the functions φi are N distinct real-valued
functions on {0, 1}K+1 and, as usual, we assign to each
φi a uniformly distributed random number in the unit
interval [9]. Because of the randomness of φi, we can
guarantee that Φ ∈ (0, 1) has a unique global maximum
and that different strings have different fitness values.
For K = 0 there are no local maxima and the sole
maximum of Φ is easily located by picking for each com-
ponent i the state xi = 0 if φi (0) > φi (1) or the state
xi = 1, otherwise. However, for K > 0 finding the global
maximum of the NK model is a NP-complete problem
[16], which means that the time required to solve the
problem using any currently known deterministic algo-
rithm increases exponentially fast with the length N of
the strings. The increase of the parameter K from 0 to
N − 1 decreases the correlation between the fitness of
neighboring strings (i.e., strings that differ at a single
component) in the state space and for K = N − 1, those
fitness values are uncorrelated [17].
Since the functions φi in eq. (1) are random, the
ruggedness measures (e.g., the number of local maxima)
of a particular realization of a NK landscape are not
fixed by the choice of the parameters N and K > 0.
In fact, those measures can vary considerably between
landscapes with the same values of those parameters [9],
which implies that the performances of search heuristics
that rely on the local correlations of the fitness landscape
will depend on the particular realization of that land-
scape. Thus, in order to highlight the role of the param-
eters that are relevant to our goal of exploring the effects
of the policies of allocation of information to the agents
on group performance, here we compare the performance
of the groups for the same realizations of the NK fitness
landscapes. In particular, we consider two types of NK
landscapes: smooth landscapes with N = 12 and K = 0,
and rugged landscapes with N = 12 and K = 4. For
fixed N , all NK landscapes with K = 0 are equivalent
and so we can consider a single realization of the smooth
3NK landscapes without lack of generality. For K = 4,
however, we must average the group performance over
an ensemble of landscapes in order to obtain statistical
meaningful results. To guarantee that the groups solve
the same tasks we generate and store a set of 30 land-
scape realizations with parameters N = 12 and K = 4 so
the same landscape realizations are used for different pa-
rameters of the imitative learning search. The minimum
and the maximum number of maxima in the landscape
realizations of our ensemble are 31 and 56, respectively,
whereas the mean number of maxima is 46.5.
III. IMITATIVE LEARNING SEARCH
We consider a system of M agents placed in a square
box of linear size L with periodic boundary conditions.
In the initial configuration, the coordinates x and y of
each agent are chosen randomly and uniformly over the
length L. The density of agents ρ = M/L2, which we fix
to ρ = 1 throughout the paper, yields the relevant spa-
tial scale to measure the distance between agents on the
square box. In fact, since the effective area of an agent is
1/ρ, the quantity d0 = 1/
√
ρ can be viewed as the linear
size or, for short, the size of an agent and it will be our
standard to measure all distances in our study. We note
that the fixed value of the density ρ is inconsequential,
provided that we use d0 as the standard for measuring
distances in the square box. Each agent is represented
by a binary string of length N , whose bits are initially
drawn at random with equal probability for 0 and 1, so
that each agent has an associated fitness value Φk with
k = 1, . . . ,M . The fitness of the agents change with
time as they explore the NK-fitness landscape aiming at
finding its global maximum by flipping bits following the
rules of the imitative learning search [7] as will be de-
scribed next. Henceforth we will use the terms agent
and string interchangeably.
The influence neighborhood of agent k is comprised
of all the agents located inside the circle of radius dk
centered at the spatial coordinates of agent k. It is among
those agents that agent k will select a model to imitate.
Here we consider the prescription
dk = d0 exp
[
α
(
Φk/Φ¯− 1
)]
(2)
where Φ¯ =
∑M
k=1 Φk/M is the mean fitness of the group
at time t and, for the sake of clarity, we have omit-
ted the dependence on t of the quantities dk, Φk and
Φ¯. The parameter α determines the radius of the influ-
ence neighborhood of each agent according to its rela-
tive fitness. For α > 0, agents with fitness higher than
average have a large influence neighborhood, i.e., they
can see and eventually copy more agents in the group,
whereas the agents with fitness lower than average have
their influence neighborhoods downsized and are likely
to become isolated for large α > 0. We refer to this
choice as the elitist policy, since the high-fitness agents
x
y
FIG. 1. Snapshot of a system of M = 100 agents, represented
by the bullets, distributed randomly in a square box with den-
sity ρ = 1. The influence neighborhoods are shown for two
selected agents only and are highlighted by circles of differ-
ent colors. This example shows that the resulting influence
network is a directed network.
have more opportunities to further improve their fitness
through imitation. For α < 0 the situation is reversed
so that the lower-than-average fitness agents have their
neighborhoods amplified and the above-than-average fit-
ness agents have theirs curtailed. We refer to this choice
as the welfarist policy. The case α = 0, where the sizes of
the influence neighborhoods are the same for all agents,
corresponds to an egalitarian policy.
This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 1 that shows a snap-
shot of a system of M = 100 agents in the square box.
Henceforth we refer to the network created by the union
of the influence neighborhoods of all agents as the in-
fluence network. This directed network reduces to the
classic undirected random geometric graph for α = 0.
The random geometric graph was originally introduced
to model wireless communication networks [10] and it
was recently used as a face-to-face network in the mod-
eling of the dynamics of human interactions [18] as well
as in the study of the effects of mobility on cooperative
processes [19].
The dynamics begins with the selection of a target
agent at random, say agent k, at time t = 0 and pro-
ceeds as follows. A circle of radius dk is drawn around
the target agent so that its influence neighborhood is de-
termined (see Fig. 1). If the influence neighborhood is
empty, i.e., there is no agent within a distance dk from
agent k, or all agents in the influence neighborhood have
fitness lower than or equal to the fitness of the agent
k, then this agent simply flips a bit at random. We re-
4call that due to the nature of the NK-fitness landscape –
the fitness are real-valued random variables – two agents
that have the same fitness must be identical (clones).
If there are agents with fitness higher than the fitness
of the target agent in its influence neighborhood, there
are two possibilities of action. The first action, which
happens with probability 1− p, consists of flipping a bit
at random of the target string as before. Through the
repeated application of this action, the agents can pro-
duce all the 2N binary strings starting from any arbitrary
string, which guarantees that the global maximum will
eventually be reached for p < 1. The second action,
which happens with probability p, is the imitation of a
model string, which is the string of highest fitness in the
influence neighborhood of the target agent. In this case,
the model and the target strings are compared and the
different bits are singled out. Then the target agent se-
lects at random one of the distinct bits and flips it so that
this bit is now the same in both strings. Hence, imita-
tion results in the increase of the similarity between the
target and the model agents, which may not necessarily
lead to an increase of the fitness of the target agent.
The parameter p ∈ [0, 1] is the imitation probability,
which we assume is the same for all agents (see [20] for
the relaxation of this assumption). The case p = 0 cor-
responds to the baseline situation where the M agents
explore the state space independently of each other. The
case p = 1 corresponds to the situation where only the
model strings explore the state space through random bit
flips, whereas the other strings simply follow the models
in their influence neighborhoods. The imitation proce-
dure described above was borrowed from the incremen-
tal assimilation mechanism used to study the influence
of external media [21–23] in Axelrod’s model of social in-
fluence [24]. This is the main feature that distinguishes
our model from previous exploration (random bit flips)
and exploitation (copy of fittest agent) models in which
the copy mechanism is non-incremental so that the target
agent is replaced by the model agent [4]. As expected,
this non-incremental mechanism may permanently trap
the search in the local maxima of the fitness landscape.
After the target agent is updated, which means that
exactly one bit of its string is flipped, we increment the
time t by the quantity ∆t = 1/M . Then another agent is
selected at random and the procedure described above is
repeated. We note that during the increment from t to
t+1, exactly M string operations are performed, though
not necessarily by M distinct agents. The search ends
when one of the agents finds the global maximum and
we denote by t∗ the halting time. Here we measure the
efficiency of the search by the total number of agent up-
dates necessary to find the global maximum (i.e., Mt∗),
which is essentially the computational cost of the search.
Since t∗ typically scales with the size of the solution space
2N , it is convenient to present the results in terms of the
rescaled computational cost, defined as
C = Mt∗/2N . (3)
In the case of the independent search (p = 0), the rugged-
ness of the landscape has no effect on the efficiency of the
search, which depends only on the length of the strings
N and on the group size M . In fact, in this case it can
be shown that the mean rescaled computational cost is
given by
〈C〉 = M
2N
[
1− (λN )M
] , (4)
where λN is the second largest eigenvalue of a tridiag-
onal stochastic matrix T [7]. The notation 〈. . .〉 stands
for the average over independent searches on the same
landscape. Notice that 〈t∗M 〉 = 1/
[
1− (λN )M
]
is the
expected number of trials for a group of M independent
agents to find the global maximum. In particular, for
N = 12 we have λ12 ≈ 0.99978 and 〈t∗1〉 ≈ 4545. Since
(λ12)
M ≈ e−M(1−λ12) we have 〈C〉 ≈ 〈t∗1〉/212 ≈ 1.11 for
M  〈t∗1〉 and 〈C〉 ≈M/212 for M  〈t∗1〉.
The assessment of the performance of the imitative
learning search is done by comparing its mean computa-
tional cost with the cost of the independent search, which
is approximated very well by the constant 〈C〉 ≈ 1.11 for
the typical group sizes M considered in the paper.
As pointed out before, the performance of the imitative
search is measured by the mean computational cost 〈C〉,
which is estimated by averaging the computational cost
defined by eq. (3) over 104 searches on the same landscape
realization. For the rugged landscapes, the resulting cost
is further averaged over the set of 30 landscape realiza-
tions. Since our main concern is the effect of the resource
allocation policies on group performance, we will fix the
imitation probability to p = 0.5 and vary the group size
M and the parameter α that appears in eq. (2) and de-
termines the strength with which the elitist (α > 0) and
welfarist (α < 0) policies are enforced, i.e., the value of α
determines how the radius of the influence neighborhood
of an agent is affected by its relative fitness.
A. Smooth Landscape
The NK fitness landscape with K = 0 is an ad-
ditive landscape (i.e., the fitness of a string is given
by the sum of the fitness of its components) that ex-
hibits a single maximum. For the particular realiza-
tion we consider here, the fitness of the maximum is
Φmax = 0.559, whereas the average fitness of the land-
scape is Φav = 0.415. The mean computational cost of
the imitative search for a landscape with N = 12 and
K = 0 is shown in Figs. 2 and 3, where the independent
variable is M and α, respectively. As already pointed
out, these results are not dependent on the realization of
the smooth landscape.
It is convenient to begin the analysis of Fig. 2 with
the results for α = 30, where we observe an initial de-
crease of the computational cost with increasing M until
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FIG. 2. Mean computational cost 〈C〉 as function of the
group size M for the imitative search on a smooth land-
scape. The imitation probability is p = 0.5 and the strength
with which the information allocation policies are enforced is
α = −30,−5, 0, 5, 30 as indicated. The parameters of the NK
landscape are N = 12 and K = 0.
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FIG. 3. Mean computational cost 〈C〉 as function of the
strength α with which the information allocation policies are
enforced for group sizes M = 10, 26, 100, 300 as indicated.
The imitation probability is p = 0.5 and the parameters of
the NK landscape are N = 12 and K = 0.
it reaches a minimum at the optimal group size M = 26.
The subsequent increase of the cost for M greater than
this optimum is probably due to the concentration of the
strings in the vicinity of the model string and the conse-
quent production of clones that end up reducing the effi-
ciency of the search [7]. The optimal group size decreases
and the group performance degrades with decreasing α.
For instance, for α = −30, the mean computational cost
reaches its minimum value at M = 3.
Figure 3 shows the computational cost against α and
reveals more clearly the interesting result that the group
performance improves with increasing α, provided that
M is not too small. This means that for the imitative
search on a smooth landscape it is advantageous to allow
the above-average fitness agents to enlarge their influence
neighborhoods so they can inspect and eventually imitate
more agents in the group. This elitist policy increases
the chances of improvement of the agents which already
have a high fitness and decreases those of the low-fitness
agents, similarly to the so-called Matthew principle in
which the rich get richer and the poor get poorer [25].
The opposite, welfarist policy in which the below-average
agents enlarge their neighborhoods (i.e., α < 0) results in
a much poorer performance, as illustrated in Figs. 2 and
3. Interestingly, however, for small groups, say M < 5
in Fig. 2, the best performance is achieved for the egal-
itarian policy (α = 0) where the sizes of the influence
neighborhoods are not dependent on the fitness of the
agents (i.e., dk = d0 for k = 1, . . . ,M). To conclude the
analysis of the group performance, we stress that the im-
itative search always outperforms the independent search
for the smooth landscape.
It is instructive to look into the characteristics of the
agent that found the global maximum and, consequently,
halted the search. We refer to this agent as the winner.
A useful quantity in this context is the distribution of
probability of the number of agents in the winner’s in-
fluence neighborhood, Ωw = 0, . . . ,M − 1, at the instant
just before it finds the global maximum, which we show
in the upper panel of Fig. 4. For the purpose of compari-
son, we show in the lower panel of Fig. 4 the distribution
of probability of the number of agents in the influence
neighborhood of a randomly selected agent at the same
instant. We note that P (Ω) gives effectively the distri-
bution of the sizes of the influence neighborhoods at the
trial just before the search halts. For α < 0, these results
indicate that the winner is very likely to be an isolated
agent (i.e., Ωw = 0), as expected, though there are little
more than 10% of isolated agents when the search halts.
In fact, since the winner must differ of exactly one bit
from the global maximum just before it flips the discor-
dant bit, its fitness must be high and, consequently, its
influence neighborhood must be small. The same reason-
ing applies for α > 0, so the winner is very likely to be
connected to all the other agents (i.e., Ωw = M − 1), al-
though, in this case, there are very few highly connected
agents in the group as shown in the lower panel of Fig.
4. Hence, regarding the sizes of their influence neighbor-
hoods and provided an information allocation policy is
enforced (i.e., α 6= 0), the winners are atypical agents
just before they find the global maximum.
In order to investigate whether the winners had an
edge in the initial random setup of the group, we cal-
culate the difference between the fitness of the winners
at time t = 0, Φw (0), and the initial mean fitness of
the group, Φ¯ (0), for each search. Then we average
this difference over the 104 searches and show the re-
sult
〈
Φw (0)− Φ¯ (0)
〉
in Fig. 5. Here the notation 〈. . .〉
represents an average over different searches and, in the
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FIG. 4. Probability distribution of the number of agents in
the influence neighborhood of the winner (upper panel) and
of a randomly selected agent (lower panel) at the instant just
before the winner finds the global maximum for M = 26 and
α = −5, 0, 5 as indicated. The imitation probability is p = 0.5
and the parameters of the NK landscape are N = 12 and
K = 0.
case of rugged landscapes, over landscape realizations,
whereas ¯. . . stands for an average over the agents in the
group. The effect of the group size M can be understood
by noting that for small M the chances that an agent –
an outlier– is assigned a high fitness value at t = 0 are
very meager and so, in this case, Φw (0) does not differ
much from the group average Φ¯ (0). As M increases, the
chances that an outlier appears increase and the result
that
〈
Φw (0)− Φ¯ (0)
〉
> 0 indicates that those outliers
are more likely to be the winners, regardless of the value
of α. The dependence of
〈
Φw (0)− Φ¯ (0)
〉
on α for fixed
M is more instructive, as it shows that the elitist pol-
icy (α > 0) practically selects the future winners already
in the initial generation by allowing the fittest agent to
reap all the benefits of imitative learning. This is again
an illustration of the Matthew principle in action.
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
α
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
〈Φ
w
(0
)
−
Φ
(0
)〉
10
26
100
300
FIG. 5. Average difference between the initial fitness of win-
ner and the initial mean fitness of the group
〈
Φw (0)− Φ¯ (0)
〉
as function of the strength α with which the informa-
tion allocation policies are enforced for group sizes M =
10, 26, 100, 300 as indicated. The imitation probability is
p = 0.5 and the parameters of the NK landscape are N = 12
and K = 0.
Since for α 6= 0 the sizes of the influence neighborhoods
vary as the agents explore the fitness landscape through
the imitative search, it is of interest to characterize the
influence networks when the search halts. As pointed out,
an influence network, which is formed by the union of the
influence neighborhoods of all agents, is a directed graph
where the agents are the nodes and neighboring agents
are connected by directed edges (see Fig. 1). Since the
nub of the imitative search is to spread useful information
(i.e., bits that increase fitness) among the members of the
group, we focus only on the connectivity properties of the
influence networks.
We recall that a directed graph is said to be strongly
connected if every node is reachable from every other
node, and a strongly connected component (SCC) of a di-
rected graph is a maximal strongly connected subgraph
[26]. Thus, following the usual line of analysis used to
study percolation [27], we consider the number Nc of
SCCs and the size Gc of the largest SCC of the influ-
ence network when the search halts. By the size of a
SCC we mean the number of nodes that belong to it.
Figure 6 shows these two quantities in a properly nor-
malized form, viz., nc = Nc/M and gc = Gc/M . The
fraction of SCCs reaches its minimum value for α = 0
and is slightly asymmetric around that point, i.e., there
is a bit more SCCs for positive than for negative α. The
size of the largest SCC exhibits this slight asymmetry
too. The quasi-invariance of the properties of the SCCs
to change in the sign of α is expected since when α is
replaced by −α there is essentially an interchange of the
influence neighborhoods between agents whose fitness are
above and below the mean fitness of the group by similar
amounts.
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FIG. 6. Fraction of strongly connected components nc (up-
per panel) and fraction of agents in the largest strongly con-
nected component gc (lower panel) for group sizes M =
10, 26, 100, 300 as indicated. The imitation probability is
p = 0.5 and the parameters of the NK landscape are N = 12
and K = 0.
The fact that the largest SCC occurs for α = 0 for
small group sizes and contains about 90% of the agents
may be the reason that the egalitarian policy is optimal
in this situation (see Fig. 2). For large M , however, there
is no obvious link between gc and the computational cost,
since gc is practically the same for α = 10 and α = −10,
but the costs are very distinct (see Fig. 3).
It is interesting to note that, for | α |< 5, gc goes to zero
as M increases so that the directed graph is composed
of a macroscopic number of microscopic SCCs since nc is
nonzero. For | α |> 5 we also have a macroscopic num-
ber of SCCs, but now at least one component is macro-
scopic. In time, a quantity is macroscopic (microscopic)
if it grows linearly (sublinearly) with M in the asymp-
totic limit M →∞. Moreover, we observe in Fig. 6 that
there is a region where both gc and nc increase with in-
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FIG. 7. Mean computational cost 〈C〉 as function of the
group size M for the imitative search on rugged landscapes.
The imitation probability is p = 0.5 and the strength with
which the information allocation policies are enforced is α =
−30,−5, 0, 5, 30 as indicated. The parameters of the NK land-
scapes are N = 12 and K = 4.
creasing | α |. This means that while the largest SCC
takes in new nodes, other components break into small
components. This is expected considering the dual effect
of increasing | α | which increases the influence neigh-
borhood of some agents and decrease of others, probably
producing isolated agents which would explain the in-
crease of nc.
B. Rugged Landscapes
Since even the less rugged landscape in our ensemble
of 30 NK-fitness landscapes with parameters N = 12
and K = 4 has 31 maxima, finding the unique global
maximum of each realization in this set poses a difficult
challenge to any hill-climbing type of search strategy. In
fact, the presence of those local maxima makes the com-
putational cost of the imitative search very susceptible
to the choice of the group size and of the policy to allot
information to the agents. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the
intricacies of this choice.
Whereas the best performance shown in Fig. 7 is a-
chieved by the highly elitist policy (α = 30) for M ≈ 26,
this policy gives the worst performance for groups of
small and intermediate sizes. In particular, the peak of
the cost observed for groups of intermediate size can be
viewed as a groupthink-like phenomenon [28] that hap-
pens because the agents are trapped in high fitness local
maxima far away from the global maximum. The cost to
escape those maxima can be very high due to the attrac-
tive effect of the clones of the model string [7]. Neverthe-
less, the computational cost of the imitative search is al-
ways lower than the cost of the independent search, which
is 〈C〉 ≈ 1.1 for the range of M shown in the figure. This
8−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
α
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
〈C
〉
10
26
100
300
FIG. 8. Mean computational cost 〈C〉 as function of the
strength α with which the information allocation policies are
enforced for group sizes M = 10, 26, 100, 300 as indicated.
The imitation probability is p = 0.5 and the parameters of
the NK landscapes are N = 12 and K = 4.
contrasts with the results for the fully connected system
for which the maximum cost of the imitative search is
much higher than the cost of the independent search [7].
The reason is that the prescription (2) for the radiuses
of the influence neighborhoods of the agents introduces
an effective diversity in the imitation probabilities of the
agents. In fact, since isolated agents can only flip bits at
random their effective probability of imitation is zero. It
is the presence of those agents in the group that prevents
the trapping of the entire group in a local maximum,
which would then characterize a full-blown groupthink
event [20].
Interestingly, for small group sizes, the best perfor-
mance is achieved by the egalitarian policy (α = 0) as in
the case of the smooth landscape. In fact, for small group
sizes the performances of the distinct allocation policies
is little influenced by the ruggedness of the landscapes
(see Figs. 2 and 7).
Figure 8 shows that the welfarist policy (α < 0) is
always suboptimal, regardless of the value of M . By
suboptimal we mean that either α = 0 or α > 0 yield a
better performance for a fixed M . This conclusion holds
true for smooth and rugged landscapes as well (see Figs.
3 and 8).
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the number of agents
in the influence neighborhood of the winner and of a ran-
domly selected agent at the instant just before the win-
ner finds the global maximum. The winner is almost
certainly isolated for α < 0 or fully connected for α > 0,
although the size of the influence neighborhood of a ran-
domly selected agent is very little affected by the sign of
α. Use of the elitist policy (α > 0) gives an advantage
to high-fitness outliers produced in the initial setup of
the group as shown in Fig. 10, but it is not as signifi-
cant as in the case of the smooth landscape (see Fig. 5).
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FIG. 9. Probability distribution of the number of agents in
the influence neighborhood of the winner (upper panel) and
of a randomly selected agent (lower panel) at the instant just
before the winner finds the global maximum for M = 26 and
α = −5, 0, 5 as indicated. The imitation probability is p = 0.5
and the parameters of the NK landscapes are N = 12 and
K = 4.
This is probably because enlarging the influence neigh-
borhood of an agent is not necessarily advantageous for
the group performance as the fitness of the model agents
are not strongly correlated to the distances to the global
maximum as happens for the smooth landscape.
To conclude, we note that the quantities nc and gc for
the rugged landscapes are very similar to those shown in
Fig. 6 for the smooth landscape. Hence the difficulty of
the problem posed to the group does not seem to influ-
ence the connectivity properties of the influence networks
when the search halts.
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FIG. 10. Average difference between the initial fitness of win-
ner and the initial mean fitness of the group
〈
Φw (0)− Φ¯ (0)
〉
as function of the strength α with which the informa-
tion allocation policies are enforced for group sizes M =
10, 26, 100, 300 as indicated. The imitation probability is
p = 0.5 and the parameters of the NK landscapes are N = 12
and K = 4.
IV. DISCUSSION
Problem solving by small or large groups of people is a
critical issue in modern life as evinced by today’s highly
successful web-enabled collective intelligence enterprises
such as Google and Wikipedia [29]. Hence the relevance
of understanding the factors that influence the capabil-
ity of task-oriented groups to solve problems. Here we
approach this issue by combining ideas from organiza-
tional design [4] and the theory of distributed cooperative
problem-solving systems [30].
It has long been realized that the patterns of com-
munication that determine who can communicate with
whom in a task-oriented group have a great impact on
its problem-solving performance both in the case where
cooperation is mandatory to solve the task (e.g., find-
ing the common card in decks distributed to subjects as
in Leavitt-Bavelas’ experiment [31–33]) and in the case
where a single individual could in principle solve the task
(e.g., finding the global maximum of a fitness landscape
[34, 35]). However, these studies have focused on im-
posed or fixed communication patterns, thus excluding
a priori the interesting possibility of self-organization of
the communication networks.
Here we explore a scenario of flexible communication
patterns where immobile agents vary their radiuses of in-
teraction according to the (relative) quality of the solu-
tions they offer to the problem posed to the group, which
is to find the global maximum of a NK-fitness landscape.
The group performance is measured by a computational
cost that essentially tallies the total number of bit flips
performed on the M binary strings (i.e., agents) that
compose the group until the global maximum is found.
The variation of the sizes of the influence neighbor-
hoods of the agents results in a time-dependent, adap-
tive directed network that links the agents to their influ-
encers. Since the size of the influence neighborhood of an
agent is a measure of the amount of information it can
use to decide which bit to flip, it is necessary to estab-
lish a policy for allocation of information to the agents
based on their fitness. Here we consider three informa-
tion allocation strategies that are determined by the sign
of the parameter α in eq. (2). The first is the elitist pol-
icy in which agents with above-average fitness have their
influence neighborhoods amplified, whereas agents with
below-average fitness have theirs deflated. The second is
the welfarist policy in which the actions of the elitist pol-
icy are reversed, and the third is the egalitarian policy in
which the size of the influence neighborhood is the same
for all agents.
Policies for allocation of information are of great im-
portance when the links or connections between individ-
uals are costly, as in the case of social networks of gre-
garious animals where there is a direct selection pressure
to reduce the number of connections between entities be-
cause of their building and maintenance costs [36–38]. In
addition, the view of science as a massive, real-world col-
lective search problem and of scientists as single solution-
searching units [2, 5] brings forth the issue of how to
allot resources to competing scientists. Resources that
are typically used for ‘networking’ as in the scenario de-
scribed here. Moreover, the notions of exploration (dis-
covering new results) and exploitation (borrowing results
from others) are not strange to the scientific enterprise.
In this context, a natural criterion to allot funds to scien-
tists is their reputations. In the context of searching for
the global optimum of a NK-fitness landscape, the rel-
ative fitness plays the role of the scientist’s reputation,
hence our proposal of the prescription (2) to define the
radiuses of the influence neighborhoods of the agents.
Somewhat surprising, we find that for small groups the
egalitarian policy is optimal for both smooth and rugged
landscapes (Figs. 2 and 7). In addition, we find that the
elitist policy is optimal for smooth landscapes, provided
the group size is not too small. However, this policy pro-
duces disastrous results for groups of intermediate sizes in
the case of rugged landscapes, which is akin to the group-
think phenomenon of social psychology [28] that results
from the lack of opinion diversity among the group mem-
bers. The welfarist policy, on the other hand, is always
suboptimal and, in particular, it is always outperformed
by the egalitarian policy.
An interesting and realistic addition to our problem
solving-solving scenario is to consider that the members
within the group are subject to a social network be-
sides the professional network studied here. The fixed-
topology social network could be considered as a second
layer of a two-layer network [39], with the first layer being
our adaptive influence network. On the one hand, this
scenario will prevent the appearance of isolated agents,
which could improve the group performance. On the
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other hand, the effective increase of the network con-
nectivity due to the extra layer may degrade the group
performance by magnifying the groupthink phenomenon
[40]. This tradeoff makes the study of the two-layer net-
work scenario an attractive research program.
An appealing finding about the elitist policy regards
its potential to select high-fitness outliers in the initial
randomly generated group as the winner of the search,
i.e., the agent that finds the global maximum first. For
both smooth and rugged landscapes, the elitist policy
picks winners with a much higher initial mean fitness
than those of the other two policies (Figs. 5 and 10), in
accordance with the Matthew principle that ‘the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer’. More interesting, how-
ever, is the finding that even in a situation of strong wel-
fare, say α = −30 in those figures, where the high-fitness
agents are isolated and the low-fitness agents are allowed
access to the entire group, the high-fitness outliers of the
initial generation are still more likely to become winners,
so our welfarist policy cannot reverse the random initial
fitness inequality. These conclusions are valid for large
groups only, for which there is a reasonable chance of pro-
ducing a random string with fitness much higher than the
average of the group.
The characterization of the influence networks using
the distribution of the sizes of the influence neighbor-
hoods (lower panels of Figs. 4 and 9) and the statistics
of the strongly connected components (Fig. 6) reveal the
rich topology produced by the interplay between the net-
work structure and the imitative search dynamics. We
conclude that, except for small groups, some degree of
flexibility on the communication patterns among agents
can be beneficial to the group performance, provided an
elitist policy is enforced with moderate strength.
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